United Nations S/2017/574

Security Council

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5 July 2017

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Letter dated 5 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that, during its presidency of the Security Council of July 2017, China has scheduled an open debate on the topic "Peace and security in Africa: enhancing African capacities in the areas of peace and security", to be tentatively held on Tuesday, 18 July 2017.

In order to help guide the debate, China has prepared a concept note (see annex). I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Liu** Jieyi
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative
People's Republic of China

17-11243 (E) 100717

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Annex to the letter dated 5 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Chinese and English]

Concept note

Security Council open debate on peace and security in Africa: enhancing African capacities in the areas of peace and security

1. Background

Under the presidency of China in July, the Security Council plans to hold an open debate on enhancing Africa's capacity in the areas of peace and security.

As the continent with the greatest development potential, Africa is playing a very important role in maintaining world peace and promoting common development. In recent years, African countries have been committed to cooperation, self-reliance, unity and coordination, to firmly upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and to actively promoting African solutions to African problems. They have strengthened their collective security mechanisms and made important contributions to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa, which is widely commended by the international community.

The African Union-led peace operations have become a very important means to respond to conflicts and crises in Africa. The African Union-led operations in Somalia, the Lake Chad basin and the Sahel region have played an important role. In the past 15 years, the partnership between the United Nations and African Union has made considerable progress. The Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union, which expired at the end of 2016, made substantive contributions to enhancing the capacity of the African Union in the areas of peace and security. On 19 April 2017, the United Nations and African Union signed the Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, lifting their cooperation to a higher level. The United Nations has deployed, with the African Union, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, provided logistical support to the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), enhanced efforts for a political settlement to hotspot issues in Africa, including in South Sudan, Mali and the Central African Republic, and supported post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, all of which produced positive progress. The international community has also continued to step up support for the African Union and help African countries build their capacity in peace and security.

With the joint efforts of African countries, the African Union and other regional and subregional organizations as well as the international community, the African continent has maintained overall peace and stability. Nevertheless, Africa is still confronted with serious challenges in peace and security. Terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram, the Lord's Resistance Army and Al-Shabaab are posing an increasing threat. Transnational organized crime in the Sahel region and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea are still rampant. In the face of such challenges, Africa's capacity to prevent and resolve conflicts and maintain peace and stability is still inadequate. The African Union-led peace operations have been struggling with the challenges of the constraints of financial resources, equipment, technology and internal management. The international community should help Africa solve these problems through concerted efforts and continued support.

2. Past actions taken by the Security Council

On 24 May 2016, at the initiative of Egypt, the Security Council held an open debate on United Nations-African Union peace and security cooperation and issued a presidential statement (S/PRST/2016/8) stressing the importance of further strengthening cooperation with the African Union in order to assist in building its capacity in conflict prevention, crisis management and resolution, as well as post-conflict peacebuilding, and encouraging the international community to continue to contribute, and, as appropriate, more actively, in this regard. On 18 November 2016, the Security Council held an open debate on strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on issues of peace and security in Africa and adopted resolution 2320 (2016) reaffirming its determination to further enhance peace and security cooperation between the United Nations and African Union. On 25 May 2017, the report of the Secretary-General on options for authorization and support for African Union peace support operations (S/2017/454) was submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2320 (2016). The report made clear that African Union-led peace operations should be seen as an important tool for the international community to address crises in Africa and to complement United Nations peacekeeping operations. The report also stressed that the international community should help the African Union secure adequate funding for its peace operations and build its capacity to plan, finance, sustain and oversee its peace operations.

3. Objectives and focuses of the open debate

This open debate aims to push for further implementation of the resolutions and presidential statements previously adopted by the Security Council and to emphasize the importance of assisting Africa in enhancing capacity in peace and security. By combing through the difficulties and weak links in Africa's capacity-building in peace and security, the open debate will encourage the international community to improve policies and procedures in order to heed the specific needs of African countries and take specific steps to address the challenges facing Africa, so as to provide concrete and effective support for Africa's peace and security capacity-building. Council members are recommended to focus on the following issues:

(a) Respecting African countries' ownership to solve African security problems is the precondition and foundation for supporting Africa-led peace operations. How could the international community, on the basis of respecting Africa's ownership, better support the African Union and subregional organizations in building their security capacity and enhance their coordination with the United Nations?

(b) The African Union's peace and security capacity-building is confronted with challenges such as insufficient personnel, funding and resources. Continued support and help from the international community is much needed. What financing models could the United Nations consider and adopt to provide adequate, predictable and sustainable sources of funding for the African Union-led peace operations? What channels and approaches could the international community take to provide more support to the African Union collective security mechanism, in particular in training, institution-building and logistical and financial support?

(c) We support African countries' efforts in resolving hotspot issues through peaceful means such as dialogue and consultation, attaching greater importance to youth, women, children, refugees, employment and other social and economic issues, and building their capacity to provide public services and build infrastructure, which are vital to enhancing Africa's capacity for conflict prevention,

conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. In what areas could the international community strengthen cooperation to solve the root causes of Africa's peace and security threats?

(d) Africa is a continuing focus of the Security Council's deliberations and peacekeeping operations. How could the United Nations improve the efficiency of its peacekeeping operations in Africa? How could the Security Council assist Africa in combating regional terrorism, piracy, transnational organized crimes, human trafficking and other challenges and threats?

4. Format

The meeting will be held in an open debate format in order to allow all United Nations Members to discuss their views on matters pertaining to the item under consideration.

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14 July 2017
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Letter dated 5 July 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on observance of the ceasefire regime in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 29 June-5 July 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) P. **Ilichev**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

17-11979 (E) 180717 200717

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Annex to the letter dated 5 July 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (29 June 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported six incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: five in Ladhiqiyah and one in Damascus.

The Turkish representative office reported five violations in the following governorates: two in Damascus, two in Dar'a and one in Homs.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out five humanitarian operations:

Four in Aleppo city, delivering 4.9 tons of drinking water and food parcels to the local population;

One in Qunaytirah governorate, delivering 0.9 tons of food parcels to the local population.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo was 5.8 tons.

Humanitarian assistance was provided to 1,811 people.

In total, 1,413 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian field medics have provided medical assistance to 146 people.

The United Nations and partners are continuing to provide food, medical, psychological and legal assistance to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic. Work is also continuing to restore infrastructure and provide temporary housing to all those in need.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, 32 ceasefire agreements have been signed with the following populated areas: Kastan al-Fawqani, Kastan al-Tahtani, Marj al-Akhdar, Aqrabat, Ghafar al-Shamali, Kunaysah, Balmis, Bahun, Matallah, Ghafar al-Janubi, Kurayz, Arri al-Shamaliyah, Arri al-Qibliyah, Umm al-Rish, Ayn al-Sawdah, Adwan, Kafr Mid, Maryamayn and Basandinah in Idlib governorate; Tall Tutun,

Ra's al-Ayn, Atshanah Sharqiyah, Tall Bajir, Jazraya, Uthmaniyah and Tall Allush in Aleppo governorate; and Marranah, Buhur, Hasur, Butaysat al Jurd, Hadyah and Ayn al-Fawr in Homs governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,864.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs, Idlib and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 223.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on observance of the ceasefire regime (30 June 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported five incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: two in Damascus, two in Ladhiqiyah and one in Aleppo.

The Turkish representative office has reported four violations: two in Damascus governorate and two in Dar'a governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out seven humanitarian operations, including:

Six in Aleppo city, delivering 2.55 tons of drinking water, bread and food parcels to the local population;

One in Dar'a governorate, delivering 2.8 tons of food parcels to the local population.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo was 5.35 tons.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 1,677 people.

In total, 1,420 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian field medics provided medical assistance to 155 people.

The United Nations and partners are continuing to provide food, medical, psychological and legal assistance to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic. Work is also continuing to restore infrastructure and provide temporary housing to all those in need.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire regime agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 1,864.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs, Idlib and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 223.

Information builetin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on observance of the ceasefire regime (1 July 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported eight incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: six in Damascus, one in Ladhiqiyah and one in Hama.

The Turkish representative office reported seven violations in the following governorates: two in Damascus, two in Dar'a, two in Homs and one in Qunaytirah.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire regime agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 1,864.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs, Idlib and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is 228.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on observance of the ceasefire regime (2 July 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported five incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: three in Damascus, one in Aleppo and one in Ladhiqiyah.

The Turkish representative office has reported four violations: three in Damascus governorate and one in Qunaytirah governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out seven humanitarian operations:

Six in Aleppo city, delivering 2.6 tons of food parcels to the local population;

One in Ladhiqiyah governorate, delivering 1.3 tons of food parcels to the local population.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo was 3.9 tons.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 1,214 people.

In total, 1,427 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian field medics have provided medical assistance to 201 people.

The United Nations and partners are continuing to provide food, medical, psychological and legal assistance to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic. Work is also continuing to restore infrastructure and provide temporary housing to all those in need.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire regime agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 1,864.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs, Idlib and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 228.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on observance of the ceasefire regime (3 July 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported 11 incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: 6 in Damascus, 3 in Hama and 2 in Ladhiqiyah.

The Turkish representative office has reported 10 violations in the following governorates: 3 in Damascus, 3 in Suwayda', 3 in Dar'a and 1 in Hama.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out three humanitarian operations in Aleppo city, delivering 3.6 tons of drinking water to the local population.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 1,130 people.

In total, 1,430 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During humanitarian operations over the 24 past hours, Russian field medics have provided medical assistance to 184 people.

The United Nations and partners are continuing to provide food, medical, psychological and legal assistance to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic. Work is also continuing to restore infrastructure and provide temporary housing to all those in need.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, seven ceasefire agreements have been signed in Homs governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,871.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs, Idlib and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 228.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on observance of the ceasefire regime (4 July 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported six incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: four in Damascus and two in Ladhiqiyah.

The Turkish representative office has reported seven violations: four in Damascus governorate and three in Dar'a governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out three humanitarian operations in Aleppo city, delivering 3.6 tons of drinking water to the local population.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 1,130 people.

In total, 1,433 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian field medics have provided medical assistance to 329 people.

One United Nations humanitarian operation was carried out: the Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire regime agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 1,871.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs, Idlib and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 228.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on observance of the ceasefire regime (5 July 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported five incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: four in Damascus and one in Ladhiqiyah.

The Turkish representative office has reported eight violations: five in Dar'a governorate and three in Damascus governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried eight humanitarian operations:

Seven in Aleppo city, delivering 2.7 tons of food parcels to the local population;

One in Homs governorate, delivering 5.2 tons of food parcels to the local population.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo was 7.9 tons.

Humanitarian assistance was provided to 2,483 people.

In total, 1,441 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian field medics provided medical assistance to 201 people.

One United Nations humanitarian operation was carried out: the Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 20.9 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, 125 ceasefire agreements have been signed in Idlib and Hama governorates.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,996.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs, Idlib and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 228.

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Letter dated 5 July 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith information on the Russian assessment of the status of the investigation into the incident at Khan Shaykhun (4 April 2017) and the relevant report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) fact-finding mission in the Syrian Arab Republic.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) P. **Iliichev**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

17-11957 (E) 190717 190717

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Annex to the letter dated 5 July 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

The Russian assessment of the status of the investigation into the incident at Khan Shaykhun (4 April 2017) and the related report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons fact-finding mission on chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.

The Russian Federation unequivocally condemns the use of chemical weapons by any person in any place. It is our conviction that the perpetrators of such crimes must be identified and duly punished. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) fact-finding mission in Syria and the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism were established for this purpose. The fact-finding mission is called upon to determine, from the factual and scientific and technical evidence, whether toxic chemical substances were used and, if so, which ones and how; the Joint Investigative Mechanism is tasked with identifying the organizers and perpetrators of these crimes.

We see quite a number of issues here, some of which are very serious. One of them is the stark reality of the investigation into the heinous chemical incident on 4 April 2017 in Khan Shaykhun, Idlib governorate, which served as a pretext for the United States missile attack on the Sha'irat airfield in Syria, carried out in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the universally recognized norms of international law. The conclusions that we have reached over the three months since the incident occurred are set out below.

First, the experts of OPCW and the Joint Investigative Mechanism have not visited Khan Shaykhun or the Sha'irat airfield. According to the administration of the OPCW Technical Secretariat, the fact-finding mission's inspectors could not travel to Khan Shaykhun because of the security risks involved. It is claimed in The Hague that such a visit would go beyond the mandate of the mission. It is clearly appropriate to recall paragraph 12 of the terms of reference of the fact-finding mission, according to which: "The OPCW Team shall have the right of access to any and all areas which could be affected by the alleged use of toxic chemicals (...) For such access, the OPCW Team shall consult with the Government." This is precisely the case with regard to Sha'irat, especially as this airfield, according to the incessant insinuations of a number of States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, is allegedly directly involved in the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

The new leaders of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, in contrast, believe that they will be able to plan their own activities in relation to Khan Shaykhun and Sha'irat only after the publication of the final report of the fact-finding mission. Prior to the appearance of that document, however, they have also indicated that current scientific and technological methods make it unnecessary to travel to the site of the chemical attack. What about paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 2319 (2016), in which the Joint Investigative Mechanism is invited to offer its services to OPCW for establishing whether chemical weapons have been used? What about paragraphs 3 and 4 of Security Council resolution 2235 (2015), which established the Mechanism, in which there is reference to the Council's determination to identify those responsible for stockpiling and retaining chemical weapons? And what should be done about paragraph 7 of the same resolution, in which there is an explicit reference to the need to provide full access to all locations that are relevant to the fact-finding mission's investigation? Damascus offered guarantees of such

access, at least in the case of Sha'irat, and invited the fact-finding mission and the Joint Investigative Mechanism to visit this site immediately after the tragic events in Khan Shaykhun.

Second, the results of the investigations appeared surprisingly soon after the incident. They had been conducted by Turkey, Great Britain and France, which in itself raised many questions, and resulted in quite predictable and peremptory findings of guilt on the part of Damascus. For example, members of the OPCW Executive Council reported on the autopsies conducted by Turkish doctors, in which biochemical samples confirmed that three persons had died because of sarin gas. It is not clear which laboratory conducted the analyses, whether it had been certified by OPCW and whether the proper sequence of steps for collecting evidence (chain of custody) had been observed, in particular by whoever transported the deceased persons from the site of the chemical incident.

We would also like to know how it is that the French experts had already received samples that were allegedly taken directly at the scene of the event. If members of the French security forces had taken the samples themselves, then they must have had free access to the area that is controlled, according to the French report, by Syrian armed opposition groups associated with Al-Qaida. In that case, the mission experts could have conducted an in-depth interview with them and asked for additional clarifying information, as in the case of the Russian military personnel of the Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defence Forces who investigated the chemical incident in Ma'arrat Umm Hawsh.

If the samples were received in a different location, such as in the territory of a country neighbouring Syria, then Paris should immediately clarify that the samples studied were allegedly from the site of the incident. Accordingly, it is not possible to draw any specific and robust conclusions, or to determine who is responsible. We would also like to receive copies of these reports, both the Turkish report and the French and British report, so that experts from other States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention can conduct a substantive study.

Third, why did these three States parties to the Convention, which have managed to obtain evidence, allegedly, of "another crime by the Assad regime" from the site of the chemical incident, not take advantage of the opportunity clearly available to the mission experts to have access to Khan Shaykhun? Especially as the Syrian forces had not only earnestly invited the fact-finding mission to visit the Sha'irat airfield, but were also ready to provide its experts with security guarantees on the route from Damascus to Khan Shaykhun, as far as the border of the Idlib governorate territory controlled by Government troops. Indeed, Security Council resolutions 2118 (2013) (para. 7), 2209 (2015) (para. 6) and 2235 (2015) (paras. 4 and 7) make provision for such cooperation with the fact-finding mission by opposition groups and States Members of the United Nations that have an influence on them. How can we comprehend such a lack of action combined with an inexhaustible desire to wholeheartedly condemn the lawfully elected authorities of Syria for any manifestation or recurrence of "chemical" terrorism in that country?

Let us now turn to the fact-finding mission's report on Khan Shaykhun. Without going into the rather obscure technical details, it must be noted that this document is, unfortunately, very biased in nature, as are the previous reports of the fact-finding mission on incidents involving chlorine gas. Reading the report leaves an uninformed reader with just one impression — that Damascus was responsible for the chemical attack in Khan Shaykhun. In this connection, what is the value of the detailed description in the words of numerous witnesses and victims of the events that took place in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017 — against a background of sirens, the roaring of Syrian aircraft, the cracks and bangs of aviation ammunition

and the efforts made to save the victims, including in the medical facilities of a neighbouring country? The report also contains repeated references to the statements of two witnesses, who were presented by the Syrian authorities, and not by the opposition or by objectionable non-governmental organizations such as the "White Helmets", which are sympathetic to the opposition. Emphasis is given, not by chance but clearly intentionally, to the fact that the statements of those two witnesses are divergent, and support the version of an act of provocation by the militants and their foreign sponsors. Should we not seek the truth of the events in these same statements, which differ from the general picture that has clearly been orchestrated by the opposition and by NGOs sympathetic to the opposition? Perhaps we should first of all seek to investigate the "real estate agents" from an armed opposition group, who rented out a building for the storage of toxic chemicals, and the ambulances from a neighbouring country that removed the injured persons, perhaps as prearranged, from the scene of the chemical attack? In summary, this is a question on top of a question, but there have been no credible responses from the fact-finding mission. In this situation, the concluding statement, as in cases of earlier episodes "substantiated" by the fact-finding mission and the Joint Investigative Mechanism, allegedly involving the use of Syrian helicopters humming in the night sky at a great height with barrels of chlorine gas, is clearly the same — another "atrocity" by Damascus.

After the publication of the fact-finding mission's report on Khan Shaykhun on 29 April 2017, the immediate reaction by the United States Department of State in this context is quite significant — an investigation of this matter by the Joint Investigative Mechanism is not necessary, as the guilty parties — the Syrian authorities — have already been identified.

It is also surprising that, in the fact-finding mission's report on Khan Shaykhun, the experts continuously and repeatedly have recourse to an ambiguous interpretation of one of the basic requirements of the Convention concerning the sequence of actions to follow when collecting evidence and material witnesses at the site of a chemical incident (chain of custody). On the one hand, it was not possible to fully comply with these basic procedures (para. 3.46) owing to the inability to visit Khan Shaykhun; on the other hand, the photograph and video materials presented by the opposition and NGOs, together with the material evidence, provide "a good degree of confidence" in the chain of custody prior to their receipt by the mission's experts (para. 3.66). Moreover, in paragraph 3.9 it is openly admitted that no forensic analysis of the electronic records was carried out. That is, the abundance of materials that was handed over to the fact-finding mission by the opposition and NGOs was not subject to strict verification concerning the location, site and timing of the image or processing, or concerning the authenticity of signatures and seals, and the probability that the images had been staged, and so on. The same can be said in relation to the report's "innovations" concerning ornithology, flora and fauna, namely: who can demonstrate, and how, that the habitat of the birds and mammals whose remains were delivered to the mission, and also the leaves from green areas affected by sarin, is Khan Shaykhun and its surroundings, rather than other regions of Syria? We can predict the response: all the sources of the aforementioned abundance of information and testimony, as noted in paragraph 4.5, had been validated by the mission in cases of earlier "chlorine gas" incidents. In other words, it was the understanding of the OPCW experts that the sources had already been "verified".

Where does that leave us? The flawed practice of conducting remote investigations from comfortable resorts in a country neighbouring Syria has continued, and this actually enabled the mission's experts to react very swiftly to the tragedy in Khan Shaykhun by attending the autopsies of the deceased and

conducting tests on the victims who were brought there. There was no need to travel anywhere for other materials, as the materials were delivered literally to the residence of the mission's experts in a centralized way by members of the armed opposition and NGOs based in Idlib governorate and in that same neighbouring country.

Such a procedure is clearly quite satisfactory for the OPCW Technical Secretariat and was long ago adopted by a unit of the fact-finding mission when investigating earlier alleged "chlorine gas" incidents. Two visits to Damascus by another unit eventually served as a pretext for the leadership of OPCW to reject entirely the idea of sending the Organization's experts to the site of a chemical incident — why do that, they said, if even the samples obtained by Syrian soldiers at the site of the chemical incident and sent by them to The Hague proved the presence of sarin. Everything else, they said, is a matter for the Joint Investigative Mechanism.

However, no one is certain whether the experts of the Joint Investigative Mechanism will ever go to Khan Shaykhun or the Sha'irat airfield in order to determine how sarin was actually used in Idlib governorate, and whether it was sarin, according to the infamous "friends of Syria", that was used in the shelling or whether it was once again a large-scale act of provocation by militants similar to what happened in eastern Ghutah or other incidents involving chemical weapons that have been unwarrantedly attributed to Damascus.

To summarize. After a preliminary reading of the fact-finding mission's report on Khan Shaykhun, one thing is clear: sarin, or a similar chemical substance, was indeed used there. This is confirmed by analysis of samples from the site of the chemical incident that were received by the Syrian authorities. However, one important question remains unanswered — by whom, in what circumstances and how it was used. It will be impossible to establish the truth without a visit to Khan Shaykhun by the experts of the fact-finding mission and the Joint Investigative Mechanism, although the perpetrators and organizers of this horrific act of provocation have already done a lot of cleaning up and manipulation. An inspection of the Sha'irat airfield is still the priority, as this facility, allegedly the storage site for the sarin used in Idlib, continues to be of concern to certain States parties to the Convention.

Time will pass, and the true circumstances of this crime will come to light. In the meantime, however, as in the case of Iraq, devastating events may take place against the backdrop of the general situation in the Middle East. There are those who wish to make use of the continued relapses and incidents of "chemical" terrorism in the region for their own short-term military and political goals. The international community cannot allow such a course of events, which would be catastrophic for the region. This new phenomenon in the activity of many terrorist and extremist groups, which is rife in Syria and Iraq, thanks to the double standards and irresponsibility of some geopolitical actors, could spread beyond the Middle East region, and many, including those same actors, may encounter it in their own territory.

As for our assessment of the factual and technical elements of the fact-finding mission's report on Khan Shaykhun, we will be ready to share it with the OPCW Technical Secretariat, the Joint Investigative Mechanism and the United Nations Security Council when experts of the relevant Russian agencies have conducted a detailed study of the document.

United Nations A/71/971-S/2017/577

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
6 July 2017

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 32
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Identical letters dated 4 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the illegal installation of a so-called border sign across the occupation line in the Tskhinvali region, dated 4 July 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 32, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kaha **Imnadze**
Permanent Representative

17-11376 (E) 100717

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 4 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the illegal installation of a so-called border sign across the occupation line in the Tskhinvali region

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia expresses its deep concern over the illegal installation of a so-called border sign across the occupation line in the Tskhinvali region, in the area of Bershueti village, Gori district, as a result of which several local farmers' agricultural lands have now partially fallen beyond the occupation line.

This is a continuation of the illegal process of so-called "borderization", which not only restricts the fundamental rights of local residents, but considerably damages the security situation on the ground and obstructs Georgia's efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Despite the international community's repeated calls, the Russian Federation continues to grossly violate the principles of international law and its commitments undertaken under the ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008.

This fact and the general situation in Georgia's occupied regions and adjacent territories once again point to the necessity of establishing international security arrangements and creating human rights monitoring mechanisms on the ground.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia calls upon the international community to duly assess the situation in Georgia's occupied territory and take respective measures to stop Russia's illegal actions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia will use all levers at its disposal, including within the framework of the Geneva international discussions and international organizations, not to let the aforesaid action of Russia remain without due international assessment and reaction.

United Nations S/2017/578

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 July 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 5 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to attach herewith the statement issued on 30 June 2017 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Sudan, in which it welcomes the reduction of the military and police components of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur decided by the Security Council in its resolution 2363 (2017), issued on 29 June 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Omer Dahab Fadl **Mohamed**
Permanent Representative

17-11441 (E) 100717 110717

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Annex to the letter dated 5 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

Press statement

Pursuant to resolution 2363 (2017) of 29 June 2017, the Security Council decided that the military and police components of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) will be reduced over the next six months to consist of 11,395 military personnel and 2,888 police personnel. This first phase of reductions will be followed by a second phase, which will begin on 1 February 2018. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomes this direct, practical step, which reflects the Security Council's assessment that Darfur has turned the page on conflict and has moved as a whole towards peace, development and reconstruction. Over the coming period, the Government of the Sudan will continue engaging positively, consulting and coordinating with the United Nations and the African Union in the context of the joint working group on the exit strategy of UNAMID with a view to ensuring a smooth and phased withdrawal. The Ministry welcomes the fact that the resolution clearly states that the situation in the five states of Darfur is stable, recognizes that the Sudanese army and police forces are fully deployed, and expresses concern at the presence of armed rebel groups outside the Sudan. The Government of the Sudan is committed to continued cooperation, providing all necessary assistance to UNAMID in finalizing its work, and ensuring that the joint mechanism on administrative and logistical issues facing UNAMID meets more frequently over the forthcoming period in order to promptly fulfil the requirements of the coming phase.

The Ministry takes this opportunity to renew its call on the rebel groups located outside the country to reject violence and immediately join the political process and reconstruction. The compromise document adopted by the national dialogue conference grants the groups the necessary assurances to join without preconditions, whenever they hear the voice of reason and choose the path of dialogue in the context of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and the road map signed by the rebel groups on 8 August 2016. The Ministry appreciates the efforts made by the Chair of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, Thabo Mbeki, the Joint Special Representative of the United Nations and the African Union in Darfur, Kingsley Mamabolo, and all international and regional partners.

The Ministry commends the Security Council and donor parties for urging support for the Darfur Development Strategy. It calls on the community of donors and relevant United Nations funds and agencies to redouble their support for the efforts of the Government of the Sudan to promote recovery, reconstruction and sustainable development; meet the needs of displaced persons and those people who have returned voluntarily to their original areas in order to resume their normal activities; and support disarmament programmes and endeavours to foster a lasting peace.

The spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
30 June 2017

United Nations S/2017/579

Security Council

Distr.: General
5 July 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 5 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey to you that the President of the Republic of the Sudan, Omer Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir, issued on 2 July 2017 Presidential Decree No. 15 for the year 2017, extending the unilateral ceasefire in all military operation scenes up to 31 October 2017. The decision, which seeks to encourage those who still carry arms to join the peace process and to join the national dialogue, comes in the context of the commitment of the Government of the Sudan to peace and to implementing the outcome of the national dialogue process.

Having brought this matter to your attention, I would be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Omer Dahab Fadl **Mohamed**
Permanent Representative

17-11247 (E) 060717

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United Nations S/2017/580

Security Council

Distr.: General
5 July 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 5 July 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

As Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, I am writing to you, also on behalf of the Permanent Representatives of Australia, Belgium, Malaysia and Ukraine (together, the "joint investigation team" countries) to the United Nations, in your capacity as President of the Security Council for the month of July.

With reference to Security Council resolution 2166 (2014) and my previous letters to the Council of 1 and 28 August, 9 September and 16 December 2014, 20 July and 13 October 2015 and 28 September 2016, we have the honour to inform you that a joint decision has been taken that those responsible for the downing of MH17 should be prosecuted in the Netherlands with close and ongoing international cooperation and support. The joint investigation team countries are resolved to ensure that those responsible are held to account and will continue to work closely together to that end.

The trial will take place within the framework of Dutch criminal justice proceedings, on the basis of tried and tested substantive and procedural criminal law. The Dutch legal system grants considerable rights to next of kin to observe and participate in proceedings. Furthermore, the Netherlands maintains a joint legal framework with many countries for legal assistance and extradition, based on multilateral and bilateral treaties. The cooperation between the investigative authorities will also continue in the prosecution phase.

The choice of prosecution mechanism is an important step on the path to trying the suspects, establishing the truth and achieving justice for the victims and their next of kin.

The independent criminal investigation by the joint investigation team is still ongoing. We recall that the Security Council, in its resolution 2166 (2014), demanded that "all States cooperate fully with efforts to establish accountability".

Australia, Belgium, Malaysia, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Ukraine remain fully committed to holding those responsible for the downing of flight MH17 to account. Justice must be done for the families and loved ones of the victims and accountability for this atrocious act must be secured.

I would be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Lise **Gregoire-van Haaren**
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative

17-11248 (E) 100717

Please recycle

United Nations A/71/970–S/2017/581

General Assembly
Security Council

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6 July 2017

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 31
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 5 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I transmit herewith for your attention the record of the ceasefire violations by the Azerbaijani armed forces during the month of June 2017 (see annex I).*

I also transmit herewith for your attention the record of ceasefire violations registered by the Ministry of Defence of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic during the month of June 2017 (see annex II).*

I kindly request that the present letter and its annexes be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* Circulated in the language of submission only.

17-11347 (E) 110717

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Annex I to the letter dated 5 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan along the State border with the Republic of Armenia

1-30 June 2017

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
1 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	9	Small arms and light weapons: 264
	Aygedzor	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15
	Movses	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Aygedzor 1)
	Sevkar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 77
	Voskevan	1	
	Koti	1	
	Jil	1	
	Chambarak	1	
2 June	Tavush region	6	Small arms and light weapons: 48
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7
	Chinari	3	
	Aygepar	1	
	Vazashen	1	
3 June	Tavush region	9	Small arms and light weapons: 86
	Chinari	5	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Paravakar	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 20
	Kayan	1	
	Berekamavan	1	
4 June	Tavush, Ararat, Vayots Dzor, Syunik regions	8	Small arms and light weapons: 107
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 5
	Movses	2	
	Kayan	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
	Khndzorut	2	
	Shaghat	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
5 June	Tavush, Syunik, Gegharkunik regions	15	Small arms and light weapons: 394
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15
	Chinari	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 60
	Paravakar	1	Grenade launchers: 7
	Aygepar	3	
	Movses	1	
	Barekamavan	1	
	Chapni	1	
	Artanish	1	
	Kutakan	1	
	Chambarak	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
6 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat regions	9	Small arms and light weapons: 144
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15
	Paravakar	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 40
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 4 (Berkaber 4)
	Vazashen	1	
	Berkaber	2	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
7 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat regions	5	Small arms and light weapons: 55
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 37
	Jil	2	
	Chambarak	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
8 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	14	Small arms and light weapons: 306
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 16
	Movses	3	Large-calibre machine guns: 201
	Voskepar	1	
	Koti	5	
	Voskevan	2	
	Chambarak	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
9 June	Tavush, Vayots Dzor, Syunik, Gegharkunik regions	19	Small arms and light weapons: 604
	Paravakar	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 11 (Chapni 10; Kayan 1)
	Movses	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 233
	Vazashen	3	
	Sevkar	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Baghanis	2	
	Koti	2	
	Berdavan	1	
	Voskevan	2	
	Khndzorut	1	
	Chapni	1	
	Chambarak	2	
10 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat regions	8	Small arms and light weapons: 75
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Aygedzor	1	
	Tsapatagh	1	
	Artanish	1	
	Jil	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
11 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	11	Small arms and light weapons: 100
	Chinari	5	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Chinari 2)
	Movses	2	
	Kakhakn	1	
	Artanish	1	
12 June	Tavush, Syunik regions	15	Small arms and light weapons: 126
	Chinari	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 18
	Movses	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 11 (Chapni 10; Paravakar 1)
	Berkaber	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 80
	Kayan	1	
	Barekamavan	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
	Dovegh	1	
	Koti	2	
	Berdavan	1	
	Chapni	1	
13 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat, Vayots Dzor regions	11	Small arms and light weapons: 98 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Chinari	1	
	Aygedzor	4	
	Paravakar	1	
	Chambarak	1	
	Artanish	1	
	Yeraskh	2	
	Khndzorut	1	
14 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Syunik regions	9	Small arms and light weapons: 170 Large-calibre machine guns: 15
	Chinari	1	
	Paravakar	4	
	Aygepar	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Artanish	1	
	Kutakan	1	
15 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat regions	16	Small arms and light weapons: 371 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 29 (Daranak 10; Chinari 11; Paravakar 8)
	Chinari	9	
	Paravakar	2	
	Kakhakn	1	
	Jil	1	
	Daranak	2	
	Yeraskh	1	
16 June	Tavush region	6	Small arms and light weapons: 139 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 18 (Barekamavan 18)
	Chinari	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Barekamavan	2	
	Baghanis	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
17 June	Tavush, Syunik, Gegharkunik regions	12	Small arms and light weapons: 85
	Kolagir	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 23
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 12 (Paravakar 12)
	Paravakar	3	Large-calibre machine guns: 10
	N.Karmiraghbyur	1	Grenade launchers: 1
	Vazashen	1	
	Barekamavan	1	
	Koti	1	
	Shaghat	1	
	Jil	1	
18 June	Tavush region	3	Small arms and light weapons: 4
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 22
	Chinari	1	
	Dovegh	1	
19 June	Tavush, Vayots Dzor, Gegharkunik regions	11	Small arms and light weapons: 91
	Aygedzor	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 8
	Chinari	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 20
	Paravakar	2	
	Movses	1	
	Khndzorut	1	
	Vahan	1	
	Chambarak	1	
20 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	9	Small arms and light weapons: 215
	Chinari	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Aygepar	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Artanish 5; Chinari 2)
	Paravakar	2	
	Artanish	1	
21 June	Tavush, Vayots Dzor regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 20
	Aygedzor	2	
	Chinari	1	
	Khndzorut	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
22 June	Tavush, Ararat regions	12	Small arms and light weapons: 163
	Aygedzor	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6
	Chinari	3	Large-calibre machine guns: 16
	Aygepar	2	
	Paravakar	2	
	Movses	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
23 June	Tavush region	31	Small arms and light weapons: 700
	Chinari	10	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 33
	Kolagir	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 13 (Chinari 4; Vazashen 9)
	Aygedzor	4	Large-calibre machine guns: 24
	Movses	4	
	Aygepar	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Vazashen	4	
	Barekamavan	5	
24 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	14	Small arms and light weapons: 177
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 28
	Paravakar	2	
	Aygepar	3	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Vazashen	3	
	Berdavan	1	
	Jil	1	
	Ttujur	1	
25 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	20	Small arms and light weapons: 752
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Aygedzor	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 16 (Barekamavan 16)
	Movses	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 100
	N. Karmiraghbyur	2	
	Aygepar	1	
	Barekamavan	6	
	Berdavan	3	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
	Vahan	1	
	Jil	1	
26 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat regions	9	Small arms and light weapons: 138
	Paravakar	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10
	Movses	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Jil 3)
	Aygepar	1	
	Pambak	1	
	Jil	2	
	Yeraskh	1	
27 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	7	Small arms and light weapons: 35
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 13
	Aygepar	4	Small-calibre mortars: 3 (Chambarak 3)
	Movses	1	
	Chambarak	1	
28 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat, Vayots Dzor regions	14	Small arms and light weapons: 240
	Chinari	4	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11
	Aygedzor	4	Large-calibre machine guns: 45
	Geghamasar	1	
	Kolagir	1	
	Barekamavan	2	
	Zangakatun	1	
	Khndzorut	1	
29 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat regions	31	Small arms and light weapons: 561
	Chinari	4	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 26
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Barekamavan 8)
	Movses	3	Large-calibre machine guns: 155
	Aygepar	4	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	12	
	Barekamavan	1	
	Berdavan	1	
	Dovegh	1	
	Kutakan	1	
	Vahan	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
30 June	Tavush, Ararat regions	8	Small arms and light weapons: 56
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 21
	Aygepar	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Aygedzor 2)
	Movses	4	
	Jil	1	

During the reporting period, one soldier of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia was wounded by fire from the Azerbaijani side.

Annex II to the letter dated 5 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with the Nagorno Karabakh Republic

1-30 June 2017

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
1 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	44	Small arms and light weapons: 316
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 124 (Mehdili 44; Nuzger 74; Seysulan 4; Levonarkh 2)
			Grenade launchers: 5
			Small-calibre mortars: 6 (Kurapatkino 6)
2 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	37	Small arms and light weapons: 1,277
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 26
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 34 (Karakhanbeyli 4; Yusifjanli 24; Verin Chaylu 6)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 12
			Grenade launchers: 2
			Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Yarmja 1)
3 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	45	Small arms and light weapons: 896
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 20
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 21 (Mehdili 2; m.Karachuk 1; Yusifjanli 15; Dastagir 3)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 15
			Grenade launchers: 4
			Small-calibre mortars: 4 (Verin Chaylu 4)
4 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 214
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 52
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 25 (Horadiz 3; Korgan 11; Gyulistan 3; Yanshak 8)
			Small-calibre mortars: 3 (Ashaghi Veysali 3)
5 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	27	Small arms and light weapons: 953
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 34
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 6 (Gyulistan 3; Marzili 3)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
6 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	18	Small arms and light weapons: 932
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 8
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 20 (Yanshak 20)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 115
7 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 815
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 33
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 29 (Mehdili 4; Ashaghi Veysali 5; Gjulistan 20)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 100
			Small-calibre mortars: 5 (Verin Chaylu 5)
8 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	21	Small arms and light weapons: 435
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Jraberd 1)
9 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	31	Small arms and light weapons: 7,395
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 37
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 14 (Ashaghi Veysali 14)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 25
			Grenade launchers: 10
10 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	51	Small arms and light weapons: 1,013
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 16
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 31 (Mehdili 8; Seysulan 20; Gyulistan 3)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 50
			Grenade launchers: 3
			Small-calibre mortars: 17 (Karakhanbeyli 3; Kurapatkino 14)
11 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	39	Small arms and light weapons: 719
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 8
			Small-calibre mortars: 23 (Taghibeyli 6; Verin Chaylu 12; Gjulistan 2; Dastagir 3)
12 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	36	Small arms and light weapons: 448
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Karakhanbeyli 4)
13 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	21	Small arms and light weapons: 289
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Taghibeyli 3)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
14 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	23	Small arms and light weapons: 185 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 9 Large-calibre machine guns: 10 Small-calibre mortars: 8 (Verin Chaylu 8)
15 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	32	Small arms and light weapons: 628 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 88 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Chakhrli 4) Small-calibre mortars: 2 (Yarmja 2)
16 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	38	Small arms and light weapons: 622 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 18
17 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	40	Small arms and light weapons: 773 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4 Large-calibre machine guns: 45 Grenade launchers: 5 Small-calibre mortars: 6 (Kurapatkino 2; Marzili 4)
18 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	75	Small arms and light weapons: 601 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 16 (Marzili 16) Grenade launchers: 18 Small-calibre mortars: 42 (Horadiz 16; Nuzger 4; Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli 1; Marzili 19; Seysulan 2)
19 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	42	Small arms and light weapons: 668 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 19 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 34 (Kurapatkino 3; m.Mrov 11; Choporlu 20)
20 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	35	Small arms and light weapons: 380 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 27 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Verin Chaylu 4)
21 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	34	Small arms and light weapons: 695 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 26 (Mehdili 9; Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 13; Ashaghi Veysali 1; Gjulistan 3) Small-calibre mortars: 16 (Kurapatkino 3; Seysulan 7; Verin Chaylu 6)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
22 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	35	Small arms and light weapons: 320
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 21
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Ashagh Veysali 1; Verin Chaylu 1)
			Small-calibre mortars: 17 (Marzili 8; Kurapatkino 1; Verin Chaylu 8)
23 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	54	Small arms and light weapons: 1,377
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 41
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 24 (Horadiz 1; Sarijanli 20; Shikhlyar 1; Verin Chaylu 2)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 50
			Grenade launchers: 7
			Small-calibre mortars: 4 (Kurapatkino 1; Namerli 3)
24 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	47	Small arms and light weapons: 760
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 35
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Nuzger 3)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 57
			Grenade launchers: 19
			Small-calibre mortars: 16 (Kurapatkino 11; Jraberd 5)
25 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 231
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 21
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 6 (m.Karachuk 1; Yusifjanli 1; Marzili 1; Gyulistan 3)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 14
			Grenade launchers: 3
			Small-calibre mortars: 6 (Darchinar 3; Ashagu Abdurakhmanli 2; Karakhanbeyli 1)
26 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 437
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 26
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Marzili 10)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 5
			Grenade launchers: 1
			Small-calibre mortars: 5 (Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 5)
27 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	29	Small arms and light weapons: 454
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 8
			Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Darchinar 1)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
28 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	37	Small arms and light weapons: 325
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 24
			Large-calibre machine guns: 12
			Small-calibre mortars: 4 (Mehdili 2; Talish 2)
29 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	29	Small arms and light weapons: 527
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10
			Large-calibre machine guns: 10
			Small-calibre mortars: 2 (Marzili 2)
30 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	37	Small arms and light weapons: 1,210
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 36
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Korgan 4; Marzili 5; Yanshak 1)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 54
			Grenade launchers: 5

During the reporting period, four soldiers of the Nagorno Karabakh Defence Army were killed and five soldiers were wounded by fire from the Azerbaijani side.

United Nations A/71/972–S/2017/582

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
11 July 2017
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 108
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Identical letters dated 6 July 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey to you the following information:

In recent days, Turkish forces yet again infiltrated the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic in several parts of country, including, in particular, the areas of I'zaz, Jibrin and Akhtarin in the northern countryside of Aleppo. This action is a continuation of the policy being implemented by the Erdoğan regime in Syrian territory, one that is founded on aggression and expansionistic illusions. In previous identical letters, Syria explained that Turkey is occupying its territory and using armed force against it. It also spelled out how the Erdoğan regime is supporting armed terrorist groups by providing them with shelter, training and weapons, and explained that the regime had begun building walls in several areas along the length of the Syrian border, grabbing vast swathes of the Syrian Arab Republic from Syrian farmers in those areas.

The Erdoğan regime's actions blatantly violate international law, Security Council resolutions concerning Syria and the letter and spirit of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The regime's actions blatantly violate, in particular, the relevant Security Council resolutions, which reaffirm the sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic and the unity of its territory and people. The recent Turkish aggression is in keeping with the destructive role being played by the Turkish Government in Syria. It makes Turkey a key partner in the terrorism and plots that are being directed against Syria and a serious threat to regional and international security and stability.

The international community understands that what the region does not need is further complication and more terrorism and destruction. Accordingly, the Syrian Arab Republic, which has repeatedly warned against the Turkish regime's dangerous policies, calls on the international community to stand up to, respond and condemn the destructive actions of Turkey. The Syrian Arab Republic reiterates that its people and army are determined to use every means available in order to defend every inch

of its territory and confront the takfirist terrorism that is backed and espoused by the Erdoğan regime.

The continued silence of the Security Council regarding the practices and policies of the regime of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will increase that regime's recklessness and its defiance of the will of the international community, which seeks to end swiftly the Syrian crisis and restore security and stability to the region.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 108, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mounzer **Mounzer**
Minister Plenipotentiary
Chargé d'affaires a.i

United Nations S/2017/583

Security Council

Distr.: General
10 July 2017

Original: English

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its full commitment to the Peace Process in the Republic of Colombia and *recalling* its resolutions 2261 and 2307 (2016),

Welcoming the "Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace" (the Final Agreement) (S/2017/272) between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP), signed in Bogotá, Colombia, on 24 November 2016, and its adoption by the Colombian Congress on 30 November 2016,

Welcoming completion of the laying down of individual arms by FARC-EP on 27 June 2017 as verified by the United Nations Mission in Colombia established by resolution 2261 (2016),

Acknowledging the letter dated 7 June 2017 from the President of Colombia on behalf of the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP (S/2017/481) requesting a second special political mission for a period of three years, renewable if necessary, in accordance with section 6.3.3 of the Final Agreement,

Underlining the importance of implementation of the Final Agreement by the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP and *recognising* the contribution that a United Nations verification mission can make in accordance with section 6.3.3 of the Final Agreement,

Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and *reaffirming further* the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Colombia,

Recognizing Colombia's ownership of the implementation of the Final Agreement,

1. *Decides* to establish a political mission in Colombia, the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (the Verification Mission), for an initial period of 12 months, headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations;

2. *Decides further* that the Verification Mission shall verify implementation by the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP of section 3.2 and 3.4 of the Final Agreement as called for in section 6.3.3 of the Final Agreement, including the process of political, economic and social reincorporation of the FARC-EP; the implementation of personal and collective security guarantees; and comprehensive

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programmes on security and protection measures for communities and organisations in the territories, and should include the required regional and local verification;

3. *Decides also* that the Verification Mission shall begin all verification activities on 26 September 2017, immediately after completion of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Colombia established by resolution 2261 (2016), and that this will commence the initial 12 month period provided for in paragraph 1;

4. *Decides also* that the Verification Mission shall work closely with the relevant verification bodies established by the Final Agreement, in particular the Commission for Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement, the National Reincorporation Council and the National Commission for Security Guarantees;

5. *Requests* the Verification Mission to work in co-ordination with United Nations Country Team Members in Colombia in accordance with their respective mandates;

6. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to initiate preparations now, including on the ground, and to present detailed recommendations to the Security Council for its consideration and approval regarding the size and operational aspects and mandate of the Verification Mission, consistent with the Final Agreement, within 45 days of the adoption of this resolution;

7. *Further requests* the United Nations Mission in Colombia established by resolution 2261 (2016) to begin provisional work anticipated by the Verification Mission in paragraph 2 of this resolution as set out in the Secretary-General's report of 23 June 2017 within its current configuration and capacity until the completion of its mandate on 25 September 2017;

8. *Further requests* the Secretary-General, based on the reporting of the Special Representative, to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the Verification Mission's mandate every 90 days after the start of its verification activities;

9. *Expresses its willingness* to work with the Government of Colombia to extend the mandate of the Verification Mission on the basis of agreement between the parties.

United Nations A/71/974–S/2017/584

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
7 July 2017

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 41
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 30 June 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 30 June 2017, addressed to you by Mehmet Dânâ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 41, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Başak **Yalçın**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex to the letter dated 30 June 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing in response to the letter dated 19 June 2017 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (S/2017/519), which yet again contains false assertions similar to those made in his previous letters. In order to set the record straight, I would like to bring the following to your kind attention.

At the outset, regarding the claims of so-called "infringements of international air traffic regulations" and "violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey", I wish, once again, to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. The civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the sole competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services within its own national airspace. As for the false assertion regarding "illegally issued" notices to airmen, it must be underlined that activities within the Ercan advisory airspace that require notices to airmen are carried out by the relevant authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in accordance with article 3 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention).

Similarly, the claim in the letter regarding the Turkish Cypriot ports is also baseless, given the fact that the Greek Cypriot administration has no jurisdiction or right of say over Northern Cyprus. Furthermore, this claim ignores the present realities on the ground, namely, the existence of two independent self-governing States on the island of Cyprus, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory.

As to the repeated false allegations regarding Ercan Airport in the North, it should once again be underlined that the technologically up-to-date Ercan area control centre and airport in North Cyprus have been providing regular, reliable and safe air traffic services since the Greek Cypriot refusal in 1977 to provide air traffic services in the northern part of the island, in line with its isolation policy that has been imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people. Ever since, all flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have taken place with the full knowledge and permission of the Civil Aviation Department of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or control. Furthermore, I would like to stress that the allegation regarding the interference of radiofrequencies is also totally baseless.

Moreover, the isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriots, which the Greek Cypriot side attempts to perpetuate by encouraging the international community to deem all air and sea ports in Northern Cyprus "illegal", is in complete contravention of international law, as well as the call made by the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in his report to the Security Council dated 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437), in which he clearly stated, "I would hope they [members of the Security Council] can give a strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development, deeming such a move as consistent with Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984)."

The legislation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on aeronautical safety meets all standards and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization, providing safe and swift navigation of aircraft landing at or taking off from Ercan Airport and using airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. All airports in Northern Cyprus are in full conformity with international standards, and necessary investments have been made to keep up with developing technology. The number of air traffic controllers has been increased in accordance with the increasing number of flights over the years, and the Ercan area control centre is in regular and close cooperation with the Ankara area control centre in order to ensure the safe conduct of all flights in the region. In 2016 alone, the number of passengers who used Ercan Airport stood at 3,628,887, while this number is expected to be around 3,900,000 in 2017. Moreover, in 2016, 27,109 aircraft used Ercan Airport for arrival and departure and 210,789 aircraft used the Ercan advisory airspace, and these numbers are expected to be around 28,080 and 225,000, respectively, in 2017. In that regard, it must also be stressed that the Turkish Cypriot side is committed to upholding the highest standards in the field of air navigation safety in full conformity with the Chicago Convention of 1944 and that it is ready to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot authorities on this very important issue.

At a time when the comprehensive settlement negotiations are at a critical stage, I deem it necessary to stress the need to fully channel all our efforts towards achieving a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus conflict in line with the established United Nations parameters and the Joint Declaration of 11 February 2014, which envisage a new partnership on the basis of the political equality of the two peoples of the island within the framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation with two constituent States of equal status. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot administration should once again be reminded that its counterpart is, and always has been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey.

Availing myself of the present opportunity, I would like to call upon the Greek Cypriot side to discontinue such counterproductive and outdated rhetoric, which is not reflective of the joint vision and cooperation expressed by the leaders of both communities on the island since the resumption of the settlement talks in May 2015. As the two future partners on the island of Cyprus, we should never lose sight of the fact that the solution to the Cyprus problem will comprehensively deal with all pending issues between the two sides and thus focus all our efforts towards the ultimate goal of settlement.

Finally, I would like to reiterate that, as the Turkish Cypriot side, we are committed to maintaining our constructive and positive stance for a results-oriented negotiating process within the context of your good offices mission in Cyprus and encourage our Greek Cypriot neighbours to follow a similar path.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 41, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations A/71/973–S/2017/585

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Security Council

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7 July 2017

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General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda items 32 and 37

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 5 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with instructions received from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the latest armed provocation by the Republic of Armenia.

On 4 July 2017, the armed forces of Armenia multiply violated the ceasefire, subjecting the armed forces of Azerbaijan along the front line and the nearby inhabited areas to intensive fire with 82- and 120-mm mortars and heavy grenade launchers. As a result of Armenia's attacks, a 51-year-old resident of the village of Alkhanli of the Fizuli district of Azerbaijan, Sahiba Guliyeva, and her 2-year-old granddaughter, Zahra Guliyeva, were killed, and another woman, 52-year-old Sarvinaz Guliyeva, was seriously wounded, while the civilian objects were substantially damaged.

It should be particularly noted that the aforementioned village is situated 4.5-5 km away from the front line, and this very fact, alongside other evidence, proves that the civilians and the civilian objects there were targeted by the armed forces of Armenia directly and deliberately, in blatant violation of international humanitarian law and international human rights law.

The Office of the Public Prosecutor of the Fizuli district of Azerbaijan instituted criminal proceedings for the commission of a crime under the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

This is not the first instance of such despicable and hateful acts by the Armenian side. Their recurrence would not be possible without the sense of impunity that Armenia enjoys despite its persistent violations of international law and contempt for human rights.

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The war waged by Armenia against Azerbaijan has claimed the lives of tens of thousands of people, ruined cities and livelihoods in the country and resulted in the forcible expulsion of more than 1 million Azerbaijanis from their homes and properties. Serious violations of international humanitarian law amounting to war crimes, crimes against humanity and acts of genocide were committed by the Armenian side in the course of its aggression against Azerbaijan. Such violations include, inter alia, direct and indiscriminate attacks against civilians, the killing of civilians, the taking and holding of hostages, the mistreatment and summary execution of prisoners of war and hostages, sexual violence, the extensive destruction of inhabited areas and public and private property, pillaging and forced displacement.

In 1992, as a result of the attack and capture of the town of Khojaly, in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, by the Armenian armed forces, hundreds of Azerbaijanis, including women, children and the elderly, were killed, wounded or taken hostage, while the town was razed to the ground. What happened in Khojaly was the largest massacre in the conflict (see A/71/782-S/2017/110).

Despite the establishment of a ceasefire, attacks on the towns and villages in Azerbaijan situated along the front line of the armed forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the border between the two States, have become more frequent and violent in recent times, resulting in the killing and wounding of Azerbaijani servicemen and civilians.

Thus, a 9-year-old resident of the village of Orta Garvand of the Aghdam district of Azerbaijan, Fariz Badalov, was shot dead by an Armenian sniper on 8 March 2011 (see A/65/780-S/2011/132 and A/65/821-S/2011/251); a 13-year-old resident of the village of Alibayli of the Tovuz district of Azerbaijan, Aygun Shahmaliyeva, was killed and her mother, Elnara Shahmaliyeva, was seriously wounded on 14 July 2011 (see A/65/915-S/2011/457).

In the beginning of April 2016, the armed forces of Armenia increased fighting from their positions in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, subjecting the armed forces of Azerbaijan along the front line and the adjacent densely populated areas to intensive fire with heavy artillery and large-calibre weapons. As a result of Armenia's attacks, 34 towns and villages in Azerbaijan were shelled, causing casualties among civilians and the servicemen of the armed forces of Azerbaijan as well as destroying or substantially damaging private and public property, including residences, schools and kindergartens (see A/70/838-S/2016/363, A/70/842-S/2016/370 and A/71/782-S/2017/110).

Against the background of its persistent refusal to engage in substantive and results-oriented negotiations on the political resolution of the conflict, the provocative actions of the Armenian side is yet further proof of Yerevan's deliberate attempts to escalate the situation on the ground and obstruct the peace process.

The responsibility for the killing and wounding of the residents of the village of Alkhanli in the Fizuli district of Azerbaijan on 4 July 2017, for committing other heinous crimes against the citizens of Azerbaijan during the conflict and for the consequences of such actions lies completely on the Republic of Armenia, including the President and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan.

The unlawful presence of the armed forces of Armenia in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan is the main cause of tensions and incidents that claim human lives and cause suffering in the conflict zone and the major impediment to the political settlement of the conflict.

The Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan calls upon the United Nations and Governments to strongly condemn the Republic of Armenia for deliberate attacks on Azerbaijani civilians, demand that those responsible for such acts be brought to justice, commit the leadership of Armenia to cease further provocative actions and hostile policy, comply fully with its international obligations, put a prompt end to its aggression and immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw its armed forces from the Nagorno-Karabakh region and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 32 and 37, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2017/586

Security Council

Distr.: General
10 July 2017

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus

I. Introduction

1. The present report on the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) covers developments from 16 December 2016 to 22 June 2017. It brings up to date, since the issuance of my report dated 9 January 2017 (S/2017/20), the record of activities carried out by UNFICYP pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) and subsequent Council resolutions, most recently resolution 2338 (2017).

2. As at 22 June 2017, the strength of the military component stood at 887 (84 women) for all ranks, and the strength of the police component stood at 69 (17 women) (see annex).

II. Significant political developments

3. During the reporting period, the negotiations between the Greek Cypriot leader, Nicos Anastasiades, and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mustafa Akıncı, were characterized by periods of high intensity and unprecedented progress, as well as various challenges and moments of stasis.

4. On 12 January 2017, the Conference on Cyprus was held in Geneva with the participation of the guarantor Powers, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and in the presence of the European Union as an observer. The opening of the Conference followed three days of intense negotiations between Mr. Akıncı and Mr. Anastasiades, from 9 to 11 January, culminating in the presentation by each side of its maps with territorial adjustments, which were safely stored in a United Nations vault. The Conference marked a historic and decisive phase in the Cyprus talks, as it was the first time that the above-mentioned actors had come together to discuss the chapter on security and guarantees, the sixth and final chapter of the negotiations.

5. Following the convening of the Conference, the sides continued to work on the island, mostly on four of the six negotiation chapters: governance and power-sharing; the economy; property; and matters relating to the European Union. Regular meetings were held between the leaders and the negotiators, and work was conducted at the expert level. In the period between 16 February and 11 April, however, the process entered a hiatus owing to controversy between the sides over the decision by the Parliament of Cyprus to introduce an annual commemoration in

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public schools of the referendum held in 1950 on union with Greece (*enosis*). The negotiations resumed on 11 April, and, in the period that followed, the leaders and negotiators engaged in frequent meetings, making some progress, albeit at a slow pace.

6. On 4 June, following a dinner with the two leaders hosted by the Secretary-General in New York, a statement was issued, announcing that the Conference would reconvene in Switzerland in June. It was noted in the statement that progress in the chapter on security and guarantees was essential for reaching an overall agreement and building trust between the two communities in relation to their future security. It was also agreed to continue in parallel the bicommunal negotiations on all other outstanding issues, beginning with territory, property and governance and power-sharing. Following consultations with all participants, it was confirmed that the Conference would reconvene on 28 June at the political level, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, with the participation of Mr. Anastasiades and Mr. Akıncı, as well as the guarantor Powers, and in the presence of the European Union as an observer.

III. Activities of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

7. The Force is mandated to prevent a recurrence of fighting and to contribute to the maintenance of law and order and a return to normal conditions. By patrolling the 180-kilometre buffer zone, the military and police components prevent military violations or incidents that could raise tension between the opposing forces, between civilians and military personnel and among civilians. Continual liaison by UNFICYP with military, police and civilian counterparts on both sides of the island is important in the absence of direct contact between those bodies. The civilian component of UNFICYP, in coordination with the military and police components, works inter alia to manage civilian activity in the buffer zone and build confidence between the two communities through a variety of intercommunal initiatives, contributing to broader United Nations efforts to support the peace process.

A. Prevention of a recurrence of fighting and maintenance of the military status quo

8. Throughout the reporting period, the integrity and stability of the buffer zone were maintained through UNFICYP liaison and coordination. Interventions by UNFICYP were required on a daily basis to manage low-level disputes or misunderstandings caused by civilian activities or cases of ill-discipline of the military and to protest against changes to the status quo and violations of the aide-memoire of 1989. In addition, the Force Commander, Chief of Staff and sector commanders of UNFICYP simultaneously maintained regular and direct lines of communication with the respective commanders to ensure effective contacts at the senior level.

9. Nevertheless, challenges to the authority of UNFICYP in the buffer zone continued. The lack of an agreed set of rules between the opposing forces and UNFICYP with regard to activity in and around the buffer zone, which UNFICYP sought to establish through the aide-memoire of 1989, remains a cause of unnecessary tension.

10. The prevalence of closed-circuit television equipment at positions, in particular those that remain manned, continued to be a concern. Such installations

confer a military advantage, unless the position is unmanned. Although no installation of new cameras has been observed in 2017, the existing manned locations with cameras installed are considered violations.

11. Military positions established by both forces inside the buffer zone that violate the status quo, in particular at Strovilia, remain in place and are classified as permanent violations. The United Nations continues to hold the Government of Turkey responsible for the status quo in Varosha.

B. Demining activity

12. During the reporting period, UNFICYP completed demining operations on the last 2 of 28 legacy minefields, the locations of which were provided to the Turkish Cypriot leader by the Greek Cypriot leader as part of a package of confidence-building measures announced in May 2015.

13. As noted in my previous report, clearance has not begun of the minefield just north of the buffer zone in Mammari, where heavy rains led to mines being washed into the buffer zone in 2014 and 2015, despite UNFICYP having raised the issue with the Turkish forces. The Force remains committed to facilitating clearance of the Mammari area and the four known remaining minefields in the buffer zone, of which three belong to the National Guard and one to the Turkish forces. While the Turkish Cypriot side has indicated that it would accept the clearance of all four areas as a package, the Greek Cypriot side maintains the position that its three minefields are required to counter a perceived threat. The Force engaged with the sides to identify priorities for the survey and clearance of minefields across the island in 2017 and 2018 and stands ready to support them, initially through a non-technical survey of the relevant areas. The Force has sought prompt agreement from the sides on initiating the survey, given the importance of demining as a safety measure and in achieving the ultimate goal of a mine-free Cyprus.

C. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions

14. The police component of UNFICYP continued to liaise with both sides to assist in the development of anti-crime strategies and to facilitate, as necessary, the investigation of crimes and criminal matters inside and across the buffer zone. The Force continued to support broader maintenance of law and order through its facilitation of the work of the Joint Communications Room, which enables information to be shared on crimes, criminal matters and humanitarian cases, in parallel with its parent body, the Technical Committee on Crime and Criminal Matters. During the reporting period, 160 communications were exchanged through the Joint Communications Room, including on cases of smuggling and escaped prisoners and one case of child abduction.

15. Such efforts notwithstanding, the division of the island continued to present challenges to law enforcement within and across the buffer zone. In January 2017, I reported on the role of UNFICYP in escorting police from both sides into the bicommunal village of Pyla to conduct simultaneous searches of eight casinos that had been operating illegally for several years. Although those searches led to the closure of the casinos, all eight have since reopened, in large part because the conditions that enabled those casinos to operate have not changed.

16. The Force continued to address high numbers of unauthorized incursions into the buffer zone by civilians. A total of 503 such incursions were recorded during the reporting period. Incursions by armed hunters are a particular source of concern,

because, dressed in fatigues, they can be mistaken for military personnel. The efforts of UNFICYP to control hunting through liaison with local authorities and intelligence-led patrols appear to have had some success, given that 17 incursions by Greek Cypriot hunters into the buffer zone were recorded in the current reporting period, compared with 80 during the same period in 2015/16. Engagement by UNFICYP also helped to defuse tension caused by construction and farming close to the ceasefire lines.

17. The number of applications submitted by civilians and permits issued by UNFICYP has steadily risen over the past decade, indicating an increase in the interest of Cypriots in making use of their property in the buffer zone, greater confidence in the security of the zone and some acceptance of the processes of UNFICYP for regulating access. The facilitation of normal civilian activity in that sensitive, militarized area remained a priority for UNFICYP and was conducted through engagement with the authorities, local community representatives and civilians seeking to work inside the area. As part of its efforts to regulate access and facilitate activities that would not compromise safety and security in the area, UNFICYP issued 970 permits for farming, civilian construction and other types of employment during the reporting period. The university in Pyla continued to operate without UNFICYP authorization.

18. Recognizing that increased trust between communities must underpin the political efforts to reach a settlement in Cyprus and contribute to a return to normal conditions, UNFICYP enhanced its support to organizations and individuals working to promote intercommunal interaction. Through the facilitation of 88 intercommunal events with 4,932 participants and by hosting an additional 98 intercommunal gatherings with 2,909 participants organized by civil society and diplomatic partners in the buffer zone, UNFICYP provided an umbrella for interaction between the communities. It also facilitated cooperation among municipal offices in Nicosia on environmental, social, health and other issues of common concern. The Cyprus Dialogue, a new initiative of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, was launched in 2017, facilitated by UNFICYP. Unions of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot journalists were convened at the Ledra Palace Hotel on 25 April as part of the programme, with a view to strengthening professional and ethical standards of journalism on the island.

19. From 18 May to the end of the reporting period, the Unite Cyprus Now group held almost daily demonstrations at the Ledra Street crossing point in the buffer zone in support of the peace talks. The Force liaised closely with relevant authorities and the organizers and maintained a visible presence at the crossing during each demonstration to help to ensure a calm atmosphere.

20. Discussion and debate within Cyprus about the role and potential of women in promoting and making peace intensified in the past months. During the reporting period, UNFICYP increased its efforts to encourage the contributions of women to peacebuilding and political decision-making by providing support to or participating in nine events focusing on issues including countering violence against women, women in the changing world of work, the involvement of women in the peace process, the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and women working in divided societies. Among those events was a global open day organized by UNFICYP on 16 December 2016.

21. The United Nations continued to facilitate the work of the 11 technical committees established by the leaders since 2008 to work on confidence-building measures aimed at improving the everyday lives of Cypriots, as well as encouraging and facilitating greater interaction among them. Notably, after many months of efforts and with the agreement of the leaders, the Technical Committee on

Education launched the Imagine programme during the reporting period. Led by the Association for Historical Dialogue and Research, the programme provides an opportunity for children from across the island to interact and for teachers from both north and south to acquire and practise techniques for peace education.

22. Eight of the technical committees are facilitated by UNFICYP, including the Technical Committee on Crossings, which resumed its work to open two crossings at Lefka-Aplici/Lefke-Aplıç and Deryneia/Derinya in the reporting period, with financial support from the European Commission and technical support from the United Nations Development Programme. Both those partners supported the work of the Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage, which has completed three major architectural restoration projects since January, providing opportunities for Greek Cypriots and Maronites to visit and worship at those sites. Of particular note was the restoration of the Maronite church Agia Marina, the first religious monument located in a military site of the Turkish forces to be restored. Although other committees continued to meet during the period, their achievements were more limited. Continued political and financial support to the technical committees is imperative if they are to fulfil in earnest their mandate to improve the daily lives of Cypriots.

23. The religious leaders of Cyprus also continued to demonstrate their commitment to joint dialogue and the promotion of religious freedom within the framework of the Religious Track of the Cyprus Peace Process under the auspices of the Embassy of Sweden. During the reporting period, they played a role in highlighting gender issues, issuing a joint statement on 8 March, under the auspices of the Religious Track, condemning all forms of violence against women. The religious leaders also devoted attention to the issue of the restoration of religious monuments and places of worship. Together with several other key actors, they helped to secure support for the stabilization of two significant churches, Saint George and Saint Jacob, which are located along the Green Line. This important cultural preservation work has been included on the agenda of the Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage.

24. Access to religious sites has been a concern of the Religious Track and worshippers alike. Although freedom of movement across the island is facilitated as a result of the seven crossings, religious sites are not always accessible to all who wish to use them. Services are permitted only once annually at some churches in the north, and cumbersome procedures are in place for the transfer of religious icons from south to north to be used during religious services. Some limitations to religious worship in mosques in the south remain in place.

25. Despite those and other impediments, Cypriots continued to express strong interest in holding religious services and commemorative activities across the island. When requested, UNFICYP endeavoured to facilitate such activities, in support of freedom of worship and as part of its wider efforts to promote intercommunal interaction and reconciliation. During the reporting period, UNFICYP facilitated the participation of more than 9,000 people in 41 such services and commemorative events, of which 4 were in the buffer zone and 37 in the north. During the same period in 2015/16, a total of 50 were held, of which 48 were in the north and 2 in the buffer zone. UNFICYP also facilitated the crossing of 983 pilgrims from the northern part of Cyprus to the Hala Sultan Tekke mosque in Larnaca on 20 December 2016. The Force noted with concern the decline in the number of religious services approved for its facilitation in the north in comparison to the same period in 2015/16, as well as other limitations and restrictions that have hampered worship. All restrictions on the freedom of worship, including those relating to access to religious sites, should be lifted.

26. Beyond the buffer zone, UNFICYP continued to deliver humanitarian assistance to the remaining, largely older, 333 Greek Cypriots (of whom 156 are men and 177 are women) and 96 Maronites (of whom 41 are men and 55 are women) residing in the north and to provide logistical support and outreach to the Greek Cypriot primary and secondary schools on the Karpas Peninsula. A Greek-speaking nurse continued to provide services to Greek Cypriots living on the Karpas Peninsula.

27. The Force continued to engage with the relevant authorities in Larnaca, Limassol and Paphos to identify issues relating to access to health, welfare and educational services for Turkish Cypriots. There were no developments with regard to the establishment of a Turkish-language school in Limassol, although Turkish-speaking pupils continued to have access to Turkish-language education at a primary school and a high school there. In connection with the previously reported incident in November 2015, in which two vehicles belonging to Turkish Cypriots were targeted by young Greek Cypriots throwing stones, UNFICYP was informed that court hearings to prosecute several individuals accused of those attacks would be held later in 2017. A clear resolution of such cases would serve to build confidence between the two communities and signal that such acts would not be tolerated in Cyprus.

28. The Force visited two Greek Cypriots held in detention facilities in the north and 13 Turkish Cypriots held in detention facilities in the south to monitor and assist with any humanitarian issues faced by them.

IV. Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus

29. As at 15 June, the bicommunal team of archaeologists of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, a long-standing confidence-building initiative, had exhumed the remains of 1,229 persons on both sides of the island. To date, the remains of 764 missing persons, of a total of 2,001, have been identified and returned to their respective families, including, during the reporting period, those of 27 individuals. In line with the permission received in November 2015, the Committee has conducted, thus far in 2017, nine excavations in military areas in the north, leading to the recovery of the remains of 14 individuals.

30. During the reporting period, the Committee continued to receive valuable support from the Mine Action Service, which gave advice on the use of detection technology, trained staff of the Committee in the operation of metal detectors and provided assistance by scanning several locations with metal detectors to help to locate burial sites. Building on years of close cooperation, in April, the Committee signed memorandums of understanding with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team in order to enhance cooperation in the training of scientists from conflict areas in the recovery and identification of the remains of missing persons.

31. From 24 April to 5 May, staff of the archival research unit and the third member of the Committee reviewed UNFICYP documents from 1963 to 1964 and from 1974, which are held in United Nations archives in New York, with the aim of locating information on additional burial sites of missing persons. An ongoing review of UNFICYP archives in Nicosia has also resulted in potentially relevant documents being shared with the members of the Committee. Throughout the reporting period, the Committee had exchanges with countries with potentially relevant archives. In the light of the advanced age of both relatives and witnesses, it is critical that the necessary means and information, including from relevant archives, be made available to the Committee as soon as possible.

V. Transition planning

32. As requested by the Security Council, the joint working group established by UNFICYP, which includes my good offices mission and is supported by relevant Headquarters departments, continued to conduct transition planning in relation to a settlement. Such planning remained focused on the key areas of United Nations support in a post-settlement period, which had been agreed upon in principle by the negotiators, in the presence of my Special Adviser and my Special Representative, in November 2016. During the reporting period, further discussions between the sides on the details of potential United Nations support for the implementation of a settlement yielded limited results.

VI. Conduct and discipline and sexual exploitation and abuse

33. During the reporting period, two category 1 allegations, not relating to sexual exploitation and abuse, were reported and referred for investigation. Two reports of category 2 allegations were referred for investigation.

34. The Force's training cell held 16 training sessions on conduct and discipline and sexual exploitation and abuse during the reporting period, involving 814 military and police personnel. The Force has also been preparing a play designed to highlight, in an interactive way, the Organization's policy on sexual exploitation and abuse.

VII. Financial and administrative aspects

35. I am pleased to report that UNFICYP has achieved gender parity among its international civilian staff, contributing to my goal of attaining gender parity and enhancing gender equality across the United Nations system. The Force continues work towards the achievement of gender parity among national staff members and, where possible, will seek to increase the proportion of women serving in military and police components, for which it will require the support of troop- and police-contributing countries.

36. The General Assembly, by its resolution 71/300, appropriated the amount of $54.0 million for the maintenance of UNFICYP for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018, inclusive of the voluntary contribution of one third of the net cost of the Force, equivalent to $18.3 million from the Government of Cyprus and the voluntary contribution of $6.5 million from the Government of Greece.

37. As at 3 July 2017, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNFICYP amounted to $15.3 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $1,462.6 million.

38. Reimbursement of troop costs was made for the period up to 30 April 2017, while reimbursement of the costs of contingent-owned equipment has been made for the period up to 31 March 2017, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

VIII. Observations

39. The Force continues to play an important role in maintaining a calm and secure environment in Cyprus and in facilitating communication across the divide. By doing so, it has created conditions conducive to the rebuilding of trust between

the communities and constructive negotiations between the sides. It is important that those gains be consolidated during the coming period.

40. I continue to call upon both communities to exert efforts to create a climate conducive to achieving greater economic and social parity between the two sides and to widen and deepen economic, social, cultural, sporting and similar ties and contacts, including with a view to encouraging trade. Such contacts promote trust between the communities and help to address the concerns of Turkish Cypriots with regard to isolation. I urge both leaders to persist in addressing those issues.

41. There have been moments of historical importance in the negotiation process, which, immediately following the end of the reporting period, reached a crucial stage during the Conference on Cyprus held in Crans-Montana, Switzerland, from 28 June to 6 July. Reflecting the strong commitment of the United Nations to supporting the negotiations towards a united Cyprus, I personally engaged with the sides on 30 June and 6 July in an effort to assist them, together with the guarantor countries, to tackle the remaining core issues so as to allow them to reach a strategic agreement on the Cyprus question. As mentioned in my remarks to the press in the early morning of 7 July, following a lengthy and complex round of negotiations, and despite the very strong commitment and engagement of the parties, the guarantor Powers and the European Union as an observer, the Conference was closed without an agreement being reached.

42. Given the disappointing outcome of the Conference, I invite the parties and in particular the leaders to reflect deeply upon the results and the possible road ahead. As to the United Nations, as facilitator of the process, its role in the framework of the negotiations remains at the disposal of the parties.

43. I commend Mr. Anastasiades and Mr. Akıncı for their commitment throughout the more than two years of leader-led negotiations and acknowledge the efforts of the guarantor Powers to work with the sides to find a mutually acceptable solution. The fate of the process is in their hands.

44. I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNFICYP for six months, until 31 January 2018, at its current authorized strength. I should like to thank the 36 countries that have contributed, since 1964, either troops, police or both to the mission. I pay tribute to the 186 peacekeepers who lost their lives over that period in support of peace in Cyprus.

45. The partnerships of the United Nations with local, regional and international actors are critical to the ongoing efforts in Cyprus. I should like to express thanks to those partners and in particular to the European Commission, which provided assistance in a number of areas during the reporting period, including through contributions for work on the two new crossing points, to the Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage and to the Committee on Missing Persons, as well as for the critically important facilitation by the United Nations of the talks under the auspices of my good offices mission.

46. I should like to express my gratitude to Elizabeth Spehar for her service as my Special Representative in Cyprus and Head of Mission and for her extensive and direct support to the talks as my Deputy Special Adviser. I also express my continued deep appreciation to my Special Adviser, Espen Barth Eide, for his unceasing efforts to facilitate the talks. Lastly, I extend my thanks to all the men and women serving in UNFICYP for the efficiency and commitment with which they have discharged the responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

Annex

Countries providing military and police personnel to the United Nations operation in Cyprus (as at 12 June 2017)

Country	*Military personnel*
Argentina	276
Austria	4
Bangladesh	2
Brazil	2
Canada	1
Chile	14
Hungary	77
Paraguay	14
Serbia	47
Slovakia	169
Ukraine	2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	279
Total[a]	**887**

Country	*Police personnel*
Australia	3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	10
Bulgaria	3
China	6
India	4
Ireland	12
Italy	2
Lithuania	1
Montenegro	4
Romania	4
Russian Federation	3
Serbia	2
Slovakia	5
Ukraine	10
Total[a]	**69**

[a] Of the military personnel, 803 are men and 84 are women. Of the police personnel, 52 are men and 17 are women.


UNFICYP DEPLOYMENT
DÉPLOIEMENT DE L'UNFICYP
ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНК
DESPLIEGUE DE LA UNFICYP
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
HQ UNFICYP
HQ UNPOL
FMPU Multinational
MFR Multinational
HQ Sector 1
ARGENTINA / PARAGUAY
ARGENTINA / CHILE
SECTOR 1
HQ Sector 2
UNITED KINGDOM
ARGENTINA
SLOVAKIA
UNPA
NICOSIA
SECTOR 2
SECTOR 4
HUNGARY
SERRIA
SLOVAKIA
HQ Sector 4
SLOVAKIA / HUNGARY
LP Strovilia Post
FAMAGUSTA
Leonarisso
Athienou
Dhenia
Xeros
K. Pyrgos
Pyla
Dhiorios
Limnitis
PAPHOS
LIMASSOL
LARNACA
Cease-fire lines of Turkish forces
Lignes de cessez-le-feu des forces turques
Линия прекращения огня турецких войск
Líneas de alto el fuego de las fuerzas turcas
Cease-fire lines of Cyprus National Guard
Lignes de cessez-le-feu de la Garde nationale chypriote
Линия прекращения огня Национальной гвардии Кипра
Líneas de alto el fuego de la Guardia Nacional Chipriota
UNFICYP operational boundaries
Limites de la zone d'opérations de l'UNFICYP
Операционные границы ВСООНК
Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la UNFICYP
District boundary
Limite de district
Границы округа
Límite de distrito
Airport, airstrip
Aéroport, piste d'atterrissage
Аэропорт, взлетно-посадочная полоса
Aeropuerto, pista de aterrizaje
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations
Map No. 2930 Rev. 92 UNITED NATIONS
July 2017
Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

United Nations A/71/980–S/2017/587

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
13 July 2017
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda items 34 and 50

Security Council
Seventy-second year

The situation in the Middle East

Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

Identical letters dated 8 July 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey to you the following information:

The Syrian Arab Republic has informed the Security Council and the President of the Security Council time and again that the Israeli occupying authorities are supporting armed terrorist groups, in contravention of all Security Council resolutions concerning the Syrian crisis. Not content with openly pursuing that disgraceful and brazen policy, the occupying authorities recently adopted new decisions regarding their intention to hold elections for so-called local councils in the villages of the occupied Syrian Golan, in accordance with so-called Israeli law.

The practices of Israel come as no surprise to either our people in the occupied Syrian Golan or the Syrian people and Government. Those unlawful practices have been going on for decades, in blatant violation of international law. Since the bloody events of the past seven years in Syria began, it is clear that Israel has been exploiting and benefiting from the crisis by supporting the armed terrorist groups.

On 25 March 1981, the Syrian Arab citizens of the occupied Golan adopted their national charter, after they had proclaimed a general strike in protest against the odious and illegal decision of Israel to annex the Syrian Golan. In that national charter, the Syrian Arab citizens of the Golan rejected the decision by Israel to incorporate their land into the Israeli entity. They also rejected the decisions of Israel aimed at stripping them of their Syrian Arab character and identity. In paragraph 5 of their charter, our people in the occupied Golan stated that they do not recognize the so-called local councils and that the heads and members of those illegitimate councils do not represent them under any circumstances. They also stated that they had taken an irrevocable decision to reject the imposition of Israeli identity on them. After Israel

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adopted its most recent illegitimate decision, the Syrian Arab citizens of the Golan reiterated that they vehemently rejected the measures that had been taken by Israel and that they would not recognize or act in accordance with them.

Israel has refused to comply with international law all these years and rejected United Nations resolutions calling for it to end its occupation of the Syrian Arab Golan. In adopting its most recent decision, Israel is reiterating its rejection of United Nations resolutions and its refusal to respect the sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic over the occupied Syrian Golan.

In its resolution 497 (1981), which was adopted by consensus on 17 December 1981, the Security Council reiterated its rejection of the Israeli decision to annex the occupied Syrian Golan by imposing a fait accompli, and decided that the decision of Israel to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the Syrian Golan is null and void and without international legal effect. The Council also demanded that Israel, the occupying Power, should rescind forthwith its decisions and actions in the occupied Syrian Golan, and determined that all the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, continue to apply to the Syrian territory occupied by Israel since 1967.

The latest Israeli decisions are yet another flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the resolutions of the Organization, international law and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Those decisions also reflect the involvement of Israel in terrorism, which it shamelessly supports through its relationship with the Nusrah Front (QDe.137) and other terrorist organizations that are killing the Syrian people and wreaking havoc.

The Syrian Arab Republic calls on the United Nations and the Security Council to condemn these latest provocative actions by Israel, which are a brazen violation of resolution 497 (1981) and will cause the situation in the region to deteriorate further. Syria also calls on the Council to compel Israel to release Syrian and Palestinian prisoners from the prisons of the Israeli occupiers, the most prominent being the prisoner Sidqi al-Maqt, who has spent more than 30 years in the terrifying prisons of Israel.

The Syrian Arab Republic unequivocally rejects the Israeli decision and reiterates that the Golan will remain an integral part of Syrian territory and will be returned to its motherland sooner or later. It also reiterates its support for the Syrian Arab citizens of the Golan in their resistance to Israel and their rejection of the Israeli decision to annex the Golan, the most recent Israeli decision concerning the Golan and any other illegitimate decisions taken by Israel, a country that still believes it can defy international law and the international community, which rejects Israel's occupation of Arab territory, its colonialist policy and its oppressive measures against our people in the occupied Syrian Golan. The international community also rejects Israeli efforts to prolong the Syrian crisis and Israel's provision of material and moral support to armed terrorist gangs. Those actions constitute yet another contravention of authoritative international resolutions concerning the war on terrorism that must be added to Israel's long record of violating international law and defying the will of the international community.

I should be grateful if these identical letters could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34 and 50, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mounzer **Mounzer**
Minister Plenipotentiary
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations S/2017/588

Security Council

Distr.: General
11 July 2017
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 8 July 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit an information note from the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation regarding the detection on 4 July 2017 of the launch of a ballistic missile by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Petr **Iliichev**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

17-11678 (E) 130717 180717

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Annex to the letter dated 8 July 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information note regarding the detection of the launch of a ballistic missile by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

On 4 July 2017, a Voronezh-type radar station in the Irkutsk region tracked the launch from the Tongchang-dong launch site (100 kilometres north-west of Pyongyang) of a Hwasong-class intermediate-range ballistic missile (see enclosure).

The missile remained in flight for approximately 14 minutes, reaching a maximum altitude of 535 kilometres and travelling a distance of 510 kilometres. It fell into the Sea of Japan.

Enclosure



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United Nations A/71/977–S/2017/589

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Security Council

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10 July 2017

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General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 61
Peacebuilding and sustaining peace

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 10 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a statement released by the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on 7 July 2017 with regard to the DPRK's successful test-fire of intercontinental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ja** Song Nam
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-11558 (E) 120717

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 10 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 7 July 2017 with regard to the fact that the United States is pulling up the Democratic People's Republic of Korea over the successful test-fire of intercontinental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14

On 4 July 2017, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) successfully carried out the test-fire of intercontinental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14, which stands for the final gate to completing the State nuclear force.

The success of the test-fire of Hwasong-14 in just one go is a brilliant victory achieved by the army and people of the DPRK in their more than half-a-century-long anti-imperialist, anti-US showdown and a heroic deed that provided a reliable guarantee of the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the region.

However, the US is condemning the DPRK's test-fire as a "global threat" and is scheming to increase the international sanctions and pressure on the country to the top notch.

The DPRK makes it clear, once again, that its development of an intercontinental ballistic rocket is an option taken to defend itself by completely terminating the hostile policy and nuclear war threat of the US that have lasted for decades over the century.

There are several nuclear-weapon States in the world today, but the US is the one and only country that makes it its daily business to impose a constant nuclear threat upon the DPRK.

The issue of the DPRK's nukes and ballistic rocket is an issue confined to the DPRK and the US, and the test-fire of the intercontinental ballistic rocket conducted by the DPRK this time is a "gift package" addressed to none other than the US.

No other intercontinental-ballistic-missile States have been more transparent than the DPRK in the development and test-fire of an intercontinental ballistic rocket.

The DPRK officially announced that it would commence the development of an intercontinental ballistic rocket as it was the inevitable choice for the country to cope with the ever-increasing nuclear threat from the US, and it opened to the public the entire process of the combustion and static firing tests of the engine and the actual test-fire of the rocket, even sensitive information, such as tactical and technical data and specifications.

That is because the DPRK's intercontinental ballistic rocket is an unquestionable nuclear war deterrent that is fundamentally different from the military equipment for aggressive war developed in strict confidence by the US with the wild ambition to dominate the world by means of surprise attacks on other nations.

Nevertheless, the US is branding the DPRK's legitimate and righteous measure for self-defence as a "global threat" and calling for "global action" against it. This is an explicit illustration of Trump's "America First Policy" that seeks its own interests by sacrificing others.

The mentality of the mugger that tries to engage the entire world in opposing a sovereign State for the reason that the State has incurred its displeasure will never find acceptance among any sensible people and independent countries.

The complete success of the test-fire of intercontinental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14 significantly enhanced the efficiency of the DPRK's nuclear force as a war deterrent, thereby more reliably ensuring peace and security in and around the Korean Peninsula.

Now that the DPRK's capability to strike the very heart of the US at any given time has been physically proved, the US will find it more difficult to dare to attack the DPRK.

Herein lies the global historic significance of the measures taken by the DPRK that have strengthened the powerful nuclear war deterrence in every dimension in pursuance of the new line of simultaneously developing the two fronts in the face of persistent pressure and sanctions by the hostile forces.

This is the only way to defend oneself and safeguard the dignity of the nation in the present hostile world where the law of the jungle prevails.

It is high time that the US completely reoriented its strategic viewpoint on the DPRK, and it should give up its hostile policy against the latter and put a definite end to its nuclear threat and blackmail without further delay.

As has been declared by respected Supreme Leader Comrade Kim Jong Un, the DPRK will neither put its nukes and ballistic missiles on the negotiating table in any case nor flinch even an inch from the road of bolstering its nuclear force unless the hostile policy and nuclear threat of the US against the DPRK are thoroughly eradicated.

The US will receive more "gift packages" of different sizes from the DPRK in endless succession, as it tries harder to destroy, by means of sanctions and pressure, the overall national power and strategic position of the DPRK, which have been drastically boosted.

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Letter dated 10 July 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for 6 and 10 July 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) P. **Ilichev**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex to the letter dated 10 July 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (6 July 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported two incidents of gunfire in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported five violations: three in Damascus governorate and two in Dar'a governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out three humanitarian operations in Aleppo city, delivering 3.6 tons of drinking water to the local population.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 1,130 people.

In total, 1,444 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian field medics have provided medical assistance to 247 people.

Two United Nations humanitarian operations were carried out:

A humanitarian convoy was sent from Ramtha, Jordan, to Tayyibah in Dar'a governorate;

The Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, four ceasefire agreements have been signed with Na'im, Jubaniyah Qurniyah and Dibbin in Homs governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process stands at 2,000.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Idlib, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 228.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (10 July 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported two incidents of gunfire: one in Ladhiqiyah governorate and one in Aleppo governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported four violations in the following governorates: one in Ladhiqiyah, one in Hama and two in Damascus.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out four humanitarian operations:

Three in Aleppo city, where 3.6 tons of food parcels and water were delivered to the local population;

One in Qunaytirah governorate, where 3.2 tons of food parcels were delivered to the local population.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo was 6.8 tons.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 2,130 people.

In total, 1,463 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian field medics have provided medical assistance to 198 people.

One United Nations humanitarian operation was carried out: the Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process stands at 2,001.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Idlib, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 228.